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 The present paper is about Noam Chomsky‟s contribution to cognitive science. The 
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reason this topic interests me is that Chomsky‟s relation to cognitive science is puzzling. On 
the one hand, Chomsky is, I think, unquestionably the most important contemporary linguist. 
Arguably, his work is still today the single most important contribution to our current 
understanding of human language and the human mind. On the other hand, Chomsky‟s work 
is either widely neglected or regarded as very controversial by philosophers of mind and 
language. Philosophers of the natural sciences try to draw general conclusions about the 
acquisition of scientific knowledge from their examination of the actual reasoning of 
scientists in physics, chemistry or the life sciences. In the philosophy of mind and language, 
little if any attention is paid to linguistic theorizing as it has developed under Chomsky‟s 
influence over the past forty-five years. 
 For the present purpose, philosophers of mind and language can be usefully divided 
into two groups: the methodological dualists and the methodological monists (in the sense of 
the great dispute between partisans and opponents of the methodological dualism between the 
Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften). To a first approximation, the latter 
assert and the former deny that mental phenomena can be studied according to the same 
standards of rationality as any other natural phenomena. Chomsky is a methodological 
naturalist (i.e., a methodological monist): he is a vigorous advocate of the view that the 
standards of rationality which are prevalent in the natural sciences should also prevail in the 
study of language and mind. It is not surprising therefore that much of his work should be 
controversial among methodological dualists. What is more surprising is that philosophers of 
mind and language who are methodological naturalists do not pay much attention to his 
achievements. This is my puzzle.  
In the present paper, I want first to justify my claim that Chomsky‟s work on language 
and mind is of crucial importance for cognitive science. Despite my not being a linguist, I will 
try to provide a sense of Chomsky‟s revolution in linguistics. Then, I will explain why 
Chomsky‟s approach to language acquisition played a crucial role in other areas of cognitive 
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science — particularly, in the study of human cognitive development. Finally, I will discuss 
some of his views that stand in sharp contrast with the views of most philosophers with 
naturalistic proclivities. One such view is Chomsky‟s thesis that normal language use is a 
mystery, not a problem that we can solve. Another one is his internalism in semantics. 
Finally, I shall argue that Chomsky‟s internalism is related to his scepticism about 
evolutionary explanations based on natural selection. 
 
1. What is a generative grammar? 
 Arguably, the contemporary scientific study of human languages started in 1957, the 
year Chomsky published his slim monograph, Syntactic Structures. His work in the 1950‟s 
opened up an entirely new approach to the study of the human ability to use language, i.e., 
generative grammar. The goal of generative grammar is to provide an explicit characterization 
of the computational properties of the human language faculty. Explicitness and testability are 
the two scientific features of linguistic theorizing made possible by generative linguistics. As 
repeatedly noted by Chomsky, this project could not have been carried out until the 1940‟s 
when the concepts became available to allow a precise account of the computational 
principles required to generate expressions of natural languages. Hence, generative grammar 
rests on the formal scientific work of mathematicians such as Turing and Church.  
 Not only does generative grammar constitute a revolution in linguistic studies. It was 
also a major factor in the “cognitive revolution” of the early 1960‟s. It is, I think, fair to say 
that Chomsky‟s (1959) review of B.F. Skinner‟s (1957) book, Verbal Behavior, made a 
decisive contribution to the overthrow of the behaviorist methodology in psychology: 
Chomsky “killed” behaviorism in the sense in which Karl Popper (1974: 69) claims credit for 
having killed logical positivism. Chomsky‟s major input to the cognitive revolution lies in his 
criticism of the behaviorist confusion between evidence and subject-matter: 
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I think that there is some significance in the ease and willingness with which modern thinking 
about man and society accepts the designation “behavioral science”. No sane person has ever 
doubted that behavior provides much of the evidence for this study — all of the evidence, if we 
interpret “behavior” in a sufficiently loose sense. But the term “behavioral science” suggests a not-
so-subtle shift of emphasis toward the evidence itself and away from the deeper underlying 
principles and abstract mental structures that might be illuminated by the evidence of behavior. It is 
as if natural science were to be designated “the science of meter readings”. What in fact would we 
expect of natural science in a culture that was satisfied to accept this designation for its activities? 
(Chomsky, 1968, 1972: 65) 
 
 The advent of the cognitive revolution was in turn responsible for the shift away from 
the study of human behavior towards the study of internal mental states and processes that 
may or not give rise to observable behavior. Hence, my first claim is that generative grammar 
was a major component of the scientific revolution that made cognitive science possible at all. 
My second claim is that, within cognitive science, generative grammar paved the way for a 
particular research program whose goal is to spell out in scientific terms the uniqueness of 
human cognition: What is distinctive of human cognition in contrast with non-human kinds of 
cognition? But, in order to substantiate these two claims, and despite my not being a linguist, 
I need to provide a sense of Chomsky‟s accomplishments in linguistic theory.  
 Ever since his earliest presentations of the task of a linguistic theory, Chomsky has 
noted that a person‟s ability to understand and produce sentences of her native tongue can 
give rise to three distinct basic questions: 
 
(Q1) What is the system of knowledge that allows a native speaker to use and understand 
sentences of her language? 
(Q2) How did this knowledge arise in her mind? 
(Q3) How is it put to use in actual speech (both in production and in comprehension)? 
 
 In response to (Q1), the linguist is expected to provide an explicit characterization of 
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the grammar of the language. As Chomsky (1986: 6) writes, 
 
a good traditional or pedagogical grammar provides a full list of exceptions (irregular verbs, etc.), 
paradigms and examples of regular constructions […]. But it does not examine the question of how 
the reader of the grammar uses such information to attain knowledge that is used to form and 
interpret new expressions, or the question of the nature and elements of this knowledge […] 
Generative grammar, in contrast, is concerned primarily with the intelligence of the reader, the 
principles and procedures brought to bear to attain full knowledge of a language.  
 
The goal of a “generative” grammar is to be explicit: an “explicit” characterization of the 
grammatical knowledge of a speaker of a natural language will be exhaustive, it will not leave 
any aspect of the speaker‟s knowledge implicit. Of course, this investigation makes both the 
concept of grammar and the concept of knowledge central to generative linguistics. I turn to 
the former first.  
 A natural language L is a set of sentences. A sentence of L is a sequence of words 
belonging to the lexicon of L. Of course, not any sequence of words of the lexicon of L counts 
as a sentence of L. To see why not, consider the contrast between (1) and (2): 
 
(1) The black cat drinks her milk. 
(2) *black her drinks milk cat the 
 
Although (2) contains the same English words as (1), unlike (1), (2) is not a sentence of 
English because the order between the words in (2) is not grammatical. Since a sentence is a 
string of words in a grammatical order, and since words have both phonological and semantic 
properties, a sentence too has phonological and semantic properties. In fact, a grammar of 
language L — L‟s syntax — is a finite device that systematically connects the former 
properties of sentences with their latter properties. Notice that we are presently talking of 
what philosophers call sentence-types, not sentence-tokens: many different utterances (or 
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inscriptions) can be tokens of one and the same abstract sentence-type. The grammar (or 
syntax) of a language characterizes the properties of sentence-types, not tokens. A generative 
grammar describes sentences, not utterances.  
 As is shown by the existence of dictionaries, the lexicon of any natural language is a 
finite set: a dictionary is just a list of words.
1
 The cardinality of any set whose members can 
be listed has to be finite. In his early work, Chomsky provided a convincing argument for the 
thesis that, although the lexicon of any natural language is finite, the set of grammatical 
sentences of a natural language is an infinite set. Thus, human languages exhibit the property 
which Chomsky calls “discrete infinity”. This can be shown informally by means of the 
following English examples (3) and (4): 
 
(3a) This flower is pretty. 
(3b) This flower is very pretty. 
(3c) This flower is very very pretty, etc.
2
 
 
Assuming the existence of a rule of insertion of the adverbial modifier „very‟ in sentence (3a), 
there is no grammatical limit to the number of such iterated insertions. If (3a) is a sentence of 
                                                 
1 Arguably, there is a purely linguistic sense in which the lexicon of a natural language is itself generative and 
hence not a finite list. This sense can be illustrated by the following example from Pinker (1994):  
missile 
anti-missile 
anti-missile missile 
anti-anti-missile missile, etc. 
From a psychological or ontogenetic point of view, however, it makes sense to assume that for the language to 
be learnable, there must exist a finite list of lexical units to keep in a finite memory. This is the sense 
emphasized in the paper. 
2 Arguably, the insertion of an adverbial modifier does not seem to work for all lexical items. If, e.g., „very‟ is 
replaced by „quite‟ as in (3*) the result seems unacceptable: 
(3a*) This flower is quite pretty. 
(3b*)*This flower is quite quite pretty.  
Perhaps the reason is not purely syntactic but pragmatic: perhaps on a scale of prettiness you can always go one 
step further and find one more possible pretty thing (just as you can add one more natural number). But you 
cannot indefinitely find one more approximately (or average) pretty thing (as if on the middle of the scale). For 
those who would argue that (3*) is a grammatical counterexample to the basic claim about recursivity, consider 
(3**): 
(3a**) Simon‟s mother was Italian. 
(3b**) Simon‟s mother‟s mother was Italian. 
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English, so are (3b), (3c) and so on. In other words, there is no grammatical limit on the size 
of a sentence formed by iterated insertions of „very‟. If an infinitely long string of words can 
belong to the set of sentences of a language, then presumably this set must be infinite.  
 
(4a) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously. 
(4b) Chomsky wrote „Colorless green ideas sleep furiously‟. 
(4c) Fodor believes that Chomsky wrote „Colorless green ideas sleep furiously‟. 
(4d) Pinker says that Fodor believes that Chomsky wrote „Colorless green ideas sleep 
furiously‟, etc. 
 
There is no grammatical limit to the number of embeddings of (4a) under an appropriate 
matrix clause in English. 
If this is correct, then it follows that the set of sentences of any natural language is 
infinite. If so, then a grammar of a natural language must be a finite device (or mechanism) 
capable of generating (or enumerating) all of the infinite sentences of the language. It must be 
finite if it is to be mastered by a human brain or mind which is a finite device. Granted, life is 
finite, energetic resources are limited and so are human attentional powers. So processing a 
infinite grammatical sequence of words belonging to whatever language is simply out of the 
question. But if the previous reasoning is correct, then, by virtue of knowing the grammar of a 
language, a person must have the ability to produce and understand an infinite set of 
sentences. The person‟s grammatical competence extends over an infinite set of sentences.
 3
 
This reasoning is the source of the claim that language is productive: knowing a language is 
knowing a potentially infinite set of sentences. On Fodor‟s (1987) assumption that sentences 
express thoughts, thoughts too form a productive set.  
 In order to generate a potentially infinite set of sentences formed out of a finite set of 
                                                                                                                                                        
(3c**) Simon‟s mother‟s mother‟s mother was Italian. 
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words, a grammar must presumably contain recursive rules, where a recursive rule is a rule 
that may re-apply to its own output. Consider e.g., the two phrase-structure rules (a) and (b): 
 
(a) S —> NP VP 
(b) VP —> V S 
 
Rule (a) says that a sentence can be analyzed into a sequence of a noun phrase followed by a 
verb phrase. Rule (b) says that a verb phrase can be analyzed into a sequence of a verb 
followed by a sentence (as illustrated by the sentence „John believes that London is pretty‟). 
Rules (a) and (b) form a recursive pair in the following sense: let (a) apply to a sequence of 
words. If (b) can apply to the output of (a), then (a) can re-apply to the output of (b), and so 
on.  
 An adequate generative grammar of English must e.g., have the means of representing 
the fact that, although superficially similar, the two following English sentences differ in 
crucial grammatical respects: 
 
(5) John is easy to please. 
(6) John is eager to please. 
 
Superficially both (5) and (6) involve the infinitival „to please‟ which is a complement of the 
main predicate of the sentence. However, any English speaker understands that in (5) „John‟ 
is the object of „to please‟, whereas in (6) „John‟ is the subject of „to please‟. In order to 
capture the relevant sorts of information, linguists posit different levels of grammatical 
representation (so-called “deep structures” and “surface structures”). 
 In the early years of generative grammar the computations performed by a grammar of 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 Strictly speaking, all that follows from the previous argument is that for any sentence containing n words 
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a natural language were basically assumed to be of two broad kinds:  
— phrase structure-rules (e.g., (a) and (b) above) that form larger syntactic units from lexical 
items, and 
— transformational rules that move one syntactic constituent from one position to another as 
in (7) and (8): 
 
(7a) John seems to be intelligent. 
(7b) [S [NP e][VP seems [S[NP John][VP to be intelligent]]]] 
(7c) [S[NP John][VP seems [S[NP e][VP to be intelligent]]]] 
 
Sentence (7a) has the so-called S-structure (or surface structure) as in (7c) which provides 
some grammatical information about it. Its so-called D-structure (or deep structure) is as in 
(7b) which provides complementary grammatical information about (7a). For example, 
whereas (7c) indicates that „John‟ is understood to be the subject of the matrix verb „seems‟ in 
(7a), (7b) represents the fact that „John‟ is also understood to be the subject of the embedded 
infinitival clause. Both (7b) and (7c) represent the fact that (7a) has an embedded infinitival 
clause which requires a noun phrase in subject position. Since this noun phrase does not have 
phonological properties (i.e., the speaker des not pronounce it), it occurs as an “empty 
category”. (7b) is generated by phrase structure rules. Then a transformational rule moves the 
NP „John‟ from its embedded position to its initial position. The movement of the constituent 
leaves a “trace” (i.e., the empty category) so that while the S-structure represents the fact that 
the moved NP is the subject of the matrix verb „seems‟, it also keeps a memory of the 
grammatical information that the NP is also understood as the subject of the embedded 
infinitive.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(where n is any natural number), there exists a sentence with n* words such that n* > n.   
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(8a) Who did Mary kiss? 
(8b) [S‟[COMP][S[NP Mary][VP kissed [NP who]]]] 
(8c) [S‟[COMP who][S[NP Mary] [VP kissed [NP e]]]] 
 
(8b), the D-structure of (6a), which results from the application of a phrase structure rule to 
lexical items, represents the fact that the NP „who‟ (an interrogative pronoun) is understood 
as the object of the verb „kiss‟. (8c), the S-structure of (8a), results from the application of a 
transformation that moves „who‟ from its object position in (8b) into the complementizer 
position. The movement rule leaves a trace so that (8c) contains both the information about 
what the surface position of the interrogative pronoun is and about its grammatical function in 
(8a).  
 Figure 1 then is a simplified model of the typical form of a grammar of a natural 
language according to the generative grammatical literature of the late 1970’s-early 1980’s: 
PF         LF 
 
 
S-structure 
 
Transformations 
 
D-structure 

Phrase structure rules 
 
Figure 1 
Both D- and S-structures are representations, while phrase structure rules and 
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transformational ruiles are operations that apply to representations. Phrase structure rules 
generate D-structures from properties of lexical items. Then transformations take D-structures 
as input and produce S-structures as output. S-structures are then “interpreted” by two kinds 
of interpretive rules: phonological rules assign phonological interpretation (PF for 
phonological form) to S-structures. Grammatical proto-semantic interpretive rules (essentially 
quantifier rules) map S-structures onto their logical forms (LF) of which I give a few simple 
examples. In fact, LFs are really syntactic structures, not genuine semantic representations in 
the sense that they fall short of providing truth-conditions for the utterances of the sentences. 
Nor are rules mapping S-structures onto LFs really semantic rules: they are transformational 
rules (or a natural extension thereof). Just as the rule of WH-motion displaces an interrogative 
pronoun into COMP, QR moves a quantifier thereby indicating its logical scope. Unlike a rule 
moving one element from its D-structure position to its S-structure position, however, the 
result of moving a constituent from S-structure to LF (by hypothesis) is of no consequence on 
the phonology of the sentence since what matters to phonology is the position occupied by a 
constituent at S-structure. Consider the S-structure (8c) of sentence (8). A proto-semantic rule 
interprets the interrogative pronoun „who‟ in COMP as a quasi-quantifier in the sense of the 
predicate calculus to yield the logical form (8d): 
 
(8c) [S‟[COMP who][S[NP Mary] [VP kissed [NP e]]]] 
(8d) [for which x] [Mary kissed x] 
 
It is not hard to recognize the similarity between formula (8d) and an existential quantified 
formula of the predicate calculus such as (8e): 
 
(8e) (x)(Mary kissed x) 
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Within the semantic framework of generative grammar, the logical form of sentence (9a), for 
instance, is represented by (9c): 
 
(9a) John invited every student. 
(9b) [S‟ [COMP [S [NP John][VP invited [NP every student]]] 
(9c) [S‟ [COMP every student][S NP John [VP invited [NP e]]]] 
 
A rule of Quantifier-Raising (QR) moves the quantified NP „every student‟ from its object 
position in the VP in (9b), the S-structure of (9a), to COMP to yield (9c), the logical form of 
(9a). QR is clearly at work in the structural disambiguation of the meaning of sentences 
involving two or more quantifiers as in (9a*) that can be assigned two distinct LFs: 
 
(9a*) Every boy likes a girl. 
(9b*) [S [every boyi ][a girlj][ei likes ej]] 
(9c*) [S [a girlj][every boyi][ei likes ej]] 
 
In (9b*) „every boy‟ has wide scope over „a girl‟ and the sentence means that every boy (in 
some group of boys) likes some member of a set of girls: different boys like different girls. In 
(9c*), „a girl‟ has wide scope over „every boy‟ and the sentence means that there exists a 
unique girl such that every member of the set of boys likes her.  
Clearly, on this view, the linguistic meaning of a sentence determined by the grammar 
(i.e., LF) is a sharply restricted part of the content conveyed by an utterance of the sentence. 
The content of an utterance is widely under-determined by the grammatically determined 
meaning of the sentence. For example, presumably the speaker of (9a) did not mean that John 
invited every student in the world. Hence, part of the content of an utterance of (9a) is that 
John invited every student in some restricted set of of students. In other words, the universal 
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quantifier „every‟ must be restricted to some universe of discourse. However, this restriction 
is not provided at the grammatical level of representation which Chomsky calls “logical 
form”. Presumably, this restriction operates at some post-grammatical level. Notice also that, 
on this view, in so far as they are both parts of grammar, semantics and phonology perform 
symmetrical operations — an assumption that I will come back to later. 
 
2. Knowledge of grammar 
 I now turn my attention to the second concept of which I said earlier that question 
(Q1) made it central to generative linguistics, the concept of knowledge (of grammar). Ever 
since he reviewed Skinner‟s (1957) book, Chomsky has claimed that what allows a person to 
use and understand sentences of her language is her knowledge of the grammar of her 
language. He has forcefully (and I think convincingly) argued over the years that any 
construal of what allows a speaker to use and understand sentences of her language in terms 
of mere dispositions to verbal behavior is bound to fail. What is present in a speaker‟s mind is 
a cognitive structure, not a set of behavioral dispositions.  
 In Chomsky‟s program, linguistic theory is primarily a theory of a cognitive structure 
— the language faculty — for which speakers‟ linguistic behavior is one relevant source of 
evidence among others. Chomsky‟s revolutionary contribution to the study of language was to 
show that speakers of natural languages know a great deal of facts about the syntactic, 
phonological and semantic structures of the expressions of their language. Some of this 
knowledge is consciously accessible. Some is not. For example, English speakers consciously 
know that, unlike (1), (2) is not a sentence of English. They consciously know that in (5) 
„John‟ is the object of „to please‟ and in (6) „John‟ is the subject of „to please‟. Much of 
speakers‟ grammatical knowledge, however, is not consciously available. It is only available 
to theoretical linguists. Speakers can form judgments about these grammatical facts about 
which they have intuitions. One major methodological contribution of generative grammar to 
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cognitive science was both to find a cognitive domain — syntax — about which human 
beings have a rich explicit and implicit knowledge and to demonstrate that speakers‟ 
grammatical intuitions are a legitimate source of data for linguistics.  
 Within the paradigm of generative grammar, linguistics is both an empirical science 
and a formal science. It is empirical because grammatical hypotheses can be tested in a 
number of ways (one of which is by checking speakers‟ intuitions). It is a formal science 
because the linguist is trying to provide a systematic axiomatic representation of speakers‟ 
grammatical knowledge. The empirical status of linguistic theories within the paradigm of 
generative grammar raises an important epistemological issue for cognitive science. It is 
customary to contrast the kinds of data used by generative linguists to construct grammatical 
hypotheses with other kinds of empirical evidence such as chronometric reaction times (used 
by psycholinguists), electrophysiological evidence (event-related potentials or ERP) gathered 
by neuropsychologists on the electrical activity of the brain or more recently data obtained by 
using brain imaging technology. There are interesting phenomenological differences between 
speakers‟ intuitions, chronometric reaction times, electrophysiological data and images of the 
brain. However, speaker‟s intuitions are genuine empirical facts relevant to the empirical task 
of testing hypotheses about the human language faculty, i.e., a particular structure in the 
human brain.  
 The claim that an ordinary speaker of a language knows the grammar of her language 
has given rise to some philosophical discussion in the late 1960‟s and early 1970‟s. 
Philosophers raised two major issues. One issue is that of whether a speaker can truly be 
ascribed knowledge of grammatical rules of which, unless she becomes a professional 
linguist, she is not even aware and which she could not at all formulate.  
 The question is complex for it is not clear that the English verb „to know‟ has a well-
defined and clear-cut meaning or expresses a single well-defined concept. Certainly, there is a 
sense in which knowledge ascriptions differ from mere belief ascriptions. In this sense, 
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knowledge is ascribed to a single individual and its ascription requires some epistemic 
conditions. Traditional epistemologists have tried to spell out necessary and sufficient 
conditions on this epistemological reading of the English word „to know‟. Two such 
necessary though not sufficient conditions for a person to be ascribed knowledge in this 
epistemological restricted sense is that the person believes that a proposition is true and that 
the proposition be true. That these two conditions are not sufficient is made evident by 
reflection on the fact that true belief may be arrived at by mere chance. If so, then it will not 
qualify as knowledge in this restricted epistemological sense. Notorious Gettier cases show 
that, contrary to the assumption of traditional epistemology, knowledge in the relevant sense 
cannot be justified true belief and how hard it is to spell out the necessary condition that must 
be added to turn true belief into knowledge.
4
 Reliabilists (who are epistemological 
“externalists”) argue that, in order to qualify as genuine knowledge, a true belief must arise 
from a reliable process of belief formation. Epistemological internalists argue that a person 
cannot know that p unless she has a justified higher-order belief that her lower-order belief 
that p is justified.  
 Mere intuition not shaped by years of philosophical training and standard scholarly 
uses of the English word „knowledge‟ by historians of ideas and social scientists as well 
suggest that knowledge can be ascribed to communities and not merely to individuals, as in 
„the knowledge of Greek astronomy‟ meant to refer to the astronomical knowledge distributed 
among ancient Greeks. In such cases, what is required is that a set of technical beliefs be 
widespread among members of a community. Such communal knowledge ascriptions do not 
relevantly contrast with mere belief ascriptions and the requirement that the propositions 
believed be true (or held to be true by the ascriber) simply vanishes.  
                                                 
4 Gettier (1963) invented famous cases in which we feel entitled to say of a person that she has a justified true 
belief that p although we would be reluctant to say that she knows that p. One example in a schematic form 
would be: suppose that X has good justifications for believing that p. Suppose, however, that p is false. Suppose 
further that from her justified false belief that p, X correctly infers the true belief that p v  q (which is true in 
virtue of the truth of q). Now, X has a justified true belief that p v  q. But would be reluctant to say that she 
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Certainly, it is true that a speaker of a natural language does not entertain beliefs, let 
alone justified true beliefs, about the grammatical rules of her language. She does not unless 
she is a professional linguist. Nor does it make much sense even to ascribe truth to the rules in 
question. Still Chomsky wants to claim that a person able to use and understand sentences of 
her language knows the grammar of her language because her ability is not a set of behavioral 
dispositions. Chomsky‟s consistent response to the worry expressed by philosophers 
concerned with the epistemological sense of „knowledge‟ has been that this sense is of 
marginal interest for cognitive science and the study of human cognition. It is mostly of 
relevance in specialized cultural and institutional contexts — either scientific or legal — in 
which the weight of the evidence in favor of a conclusion must be assessed with particular 
caution. Given that a speaker does not hold justified true beliefs about the grammar of her 
language, she can be said to tacitly know or cognize the grammar of her language. As 
Chomsky (1980: 99) puts it, the relevant concept of knowledge should be analyzed as the 
“possession of mental structures”. This response strikes me as reasonable.  
 Another important issue raised by question (Q1) about the explicit characterization of 
a speaker‟s knowledge of the grammar of her language has to do with Chomsky‟s realist view 
that there are facts of the matter as to which is the correct hypothesis about which grammar a 
speaker knows. In fact, there are two distinct issues here: one is whether it makes sense to 
assume that a speaker of a language tacitly knows one particular grammar as opposed to some 
extensionally equivalent different grammars. Like any other scientific hypothesis, a 
grammatical hypothesis can give rise to a philosophical dispute between a realist and anti-
realist (i.e., an instrumentalist) interpretation. According to the latter, a scientific hypothesis is 
merely a convenient device that allows empirical predictions. It does not purport to describe 
some real though unobservable features of the world. As with any scientific hypothesis, it is a 
legitimate question what part of the theory is supposed to be interpreted realistically and what 
                                                                                                                                                        
knows that p v  q (since her grounds for reaching the true proposition that p v  q was the false proposition that 
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part belongs to the notational system. For example, one does not expect to find in an English 
speaker‟s brain little symbols standing for syntactic categories like S, NP, VP anymore than 
one expects to observe a geometrical circle standing for the Equator. 
 The other issue is: What kind of evidence is relevant to choosing among extensionally 
equivalent grammatical descriptions? This question should itself be divided into two 
questions: one question is what kind of linguistic evidence is relevant to a grammatical 
hypothesis? In particular, the question arises whether facts in one language (e.g., Japanese) 
can be relevant to the grammar of another language (e.g., English). The other question is 
whether non-linguistic evidence can be relevant to a grammatical hypothesis. For example, is 
the electrical activity of the brain or brain imaging relevant to deciding between rival 
grammatical hypotheses? 
 Ever since Aspects (1965), Chomsky has distinguished what he calls the weak from 
the strong generative capacity of a grammar of a natural language. The former is measured by 
the set of sentences that the grammar is able to generate. The latter is measured by the set of 
structural descriptions which a grammar associates with the sentences it generates.  
 Quine‟s (1960) famous thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation can be seen as 
a sophisticated version of a methodological dualistic thesis in linguistics. The thesis asserts 
that there are no empirical facts of the matter that will allow a linguist to choose between two 
or more competing systems of translation of one utterance from one language into another 
language. Although I do not go into this topic here, Quine‟s (1960) view amounts to the claim 
that hypotheses about the meaning of a word in one language are not and cannot be, for 
principled reasons, scientific hypotheses: unlike scientific hypotheses, they cannot be either 
confirmed or disconfirmed by empirical evidence.  
 Now, on the basis of an analogy between natural and formal languages, Quine (1972) 
has in effect questioned Chomsky‟s distinction between the strong and the weak generative 
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capacity of a grammar. He has argued that it would be mysterious to claim that of two 
extensionally equivalent grammatical systems — capable of generating the same set of 
sentences — one were true and the other false. As Quine (1972) sees it, the problem is that 
indefinitely many different grammatical hypotheses (about e.g., phrase boundaries) may be 
compatible with the observable linguistic behavior (or dispositions to linguistic behavior) of 
speakers of the language. On Quine‟s (1972) view, given that two extensionally equivalent 
grammatical hypotheses are consistent with a speaker‟s behavioral dispositions, one may say 
that both hypotheses “fit” the speaker‟s behavior. But one should resist the claim that the 
speaker‟s behavior is “guided” by an “unconscious preference” for one of two rival 
grammatical hypotheses. Crucially, Quine (1972) assumes that the observable behavior of a 
speaker of language L is the only evidence relevant to hypotheses about the structure of the 
grammar of L. It seems like an innocuous assumption, but, as we shall see, it is not. 
 There are two bones of contention between Chomsky and Quine here. One is that 
Quine denies the validity of Chomsky‟s distinction between the weak and the strong 
generative capacity of a grammar of a natural language on the basis of the analogy between 
the study of formal languages and the study of natural languages. In some sense, it is obvious 
that the analogy is misleading since, unlike natural languages, formal languages are created 
by logicians, mathematicians and computer scientists for particular scientific purposes. 
Knowledge of formal languages requires teaching and special training and, unlike knowledge 
of natural languages, it is not acquired on the basis of mere exposition to linguistic evidence.  
The other disagreement between Quine and Chomsky is that Chomsky rejects Quine‟s 
restriction of the empirical evidence relevant to establishing the truth of grammatical 
hypotheses about language L to the examination of the dispositions to linguistic behavior on 
the part of speakers of L. Quine‟s view comes out clearly in one passage of his (1990) Pursuit 
of Truth: 37) : 
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In psychology one may or not be a behaviorist, but in linguistics one has no choice. Each of us 
learns his language by observing other people‟s verbal behavior and having his own faltering 
verbal behavior observed and reinforced or corrected by others. We depend strictly on overt 
behavior in observable situations. 
 
On Chomsky‟s view, evidence from the grammars of many different languages and evidence 
from the study of the brain might be relevant to the selection of a description of the 
grammatical knowledge of a speaker of L. Clarification of Chomsky‟s position must await, 
however, examination of question (Q2) to which I presently turn.  
 
3. Language acquisition and the poverty of the stimulus argument 
 The second question (Q2) that confronts linguistic theory is: How did knowledge of 
the grammar of a particular language arise in the mind of a speaker? Investigation of the first 
question is guided by the search for what Chomsky calls “descriptive adequacy”. Speakers of 
various languages know different things because languages differ. A grammar of a particular 
language must satisfy the condition of descriptive adequacy in that it must faithfully reflect 
the properties of what speakers of that particular language know. In response to the second 
question, linguistic theory must satisfy conditions of “explanatory adequacy”: it must 
contribute to explaining how a human child — any child — is able to acquire knowledge of 
her language given her exposure to linguistic data. It is quite clear that normal children 
acquire knowledge of whichever language they are exposed to. Children brought up 
respectively in Japan and in Brazil will end up speaking different languages. The search for 
descriptive adequacy and the search for explanatory adequacy pull in opposite directions. The 
former seems to lead to a variety of rule systems. The latter leads to uniformity of the human 
initial endowment that allows normal human children to acquire knowledge of the grammar 
of whatever language is spoken around them.  
 Ever since he published Aspects (1965) and Cartesian Linguistics (1966), Chomsky 
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has persistently argued that there are two main lines of response to question (Q2) about the 
acquisition of grammatical knowledge: a rationalist and an empiricist approach. As he put it 
in Aspects (p. 58), the problem of acquisition is “that of developing a hypothesis about initial 
structure that is sufficiently rich to account for acquisition of language, yet not so rich as to be 
inconsistent with the known diversity of language”. The issue between empiricists and 
rationalists is not whether language acquisition can proceed without any initial innate 
structure. As Quine (1969), a leading empiricist, readily acknowledges, any kind of learning 
presupposes the existence of a set of innate unlearned dispositions to learn. What empiricists 
and rationalists disagree about is the modularity or task-specificity of the initial state that 
allows a human child to acquire her knowledge of the grammar of her language. On 
Chomsky‟s rationalist view, human children acquire knowledge of the grammar of their 
language because they have prior knowledge of what he calls “Universal Grammar” (UG for 
short). UG is taken to be species-specific in the sense that it is a unique property of the human 
brain (or mind). It is supposed to be innately known to the human child. Finally it is supposed 
to be task-specific: its task is to enable language acquisition.  
 Notice that if a speaker‟s knowledge of the grammar of her language is a first-order 
cognitive structure, then knowledge of UG is a higher-order cognitive system. UG is the 
faculty of the human mind that, in combination with early linguistic experience, allows a 
human child to construct her knowledge of the grammar of her language. Presumably, 
whereas a speaker‟s knowledge of the grammar of her language derives from an ontogenetic 
process, knowledge of UG — the initial state of the language faculty — results from the 
phylogenetic evolution of the human species. UG is a higher-order cognitive structure present 
in the human brain as a result of evolution by natural selection.  
 In favor of his rationalist approach to the problem of language acquisition, Chomsky 
has consistently used versions of the argument by “the poverty of the stimulus”. Knowledge 
of grammar is widely under-determined by all available evidence. First of all, as Chomsky has 
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emphasized many times, unlike e.g., knowledge of historical facts, knowledge of geographical 
facts or knowledge of chemical theory, knowledge of language is not taught: it “grows” in 
children‟s minds. To see what is at issue, consider the following pairs of examples: 
 
(10a) Mary said that she would come. 
(10b) She said that Mary would come. 
 
(11a) Mary expects to feed herself. 
(11b) John wonders who Mary expects to feed herself. 
 
Anyone who understands sentences in (10) knows that in (10a), „Mary‟ and „she‟ may be 
coreferential, but not so easily, if at all, in (10b). In (11a) „herself‟ refers to what „Mary‟ 
refers to, but not so in (11b) in which „herself‟ refers to some female person other than Mary. 
Surely, no child has been taught those facts. Secondly, the actual linguistic evidence available 
to a child consists of a fragmentary and degenerate sample of her language: many actual 
utterances are incomplete sentences, for example. On the basis of such limited data, the child 
is nonetheless capable of attaining a state of knowledge that allows her to understand and 
produce novel sentences. Finally, children end up knowing structures of their language for 
which there simply was no evidence available in the set of utterances to which they have been 
exposed. This is the problem of “negative evidence”: crucial evidence for some grammatical 
knowledge consists in contrasts between well-formed sentences which the child might have 
heard and ungrammatical sequences which must have been unavailable to the child precisely 
because they are ungrammatical. Briefly, the notion of negative evidence amounts to the 
claim that in her linguistic sample a child will only find evidence of well-formed sequences of 
the language. She will not find instances of ill-formed sequences (which the linguist can 
construct on a theoretical basis).  
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 I shall present one typical example of the argument by the poverty of the stimulus 
(first advanced by Chomsky at the 1975 Royaumont Conference at which Chomsky met 
Piaget). Consider pairs of simple English Yes-No questions and their declarative counterparts 
(12): 
 
(12a) The man is tall Is the man tall? 
(12b) The book is on the table Is the book on the table? 
 
Now, consider a child learning English. On the basis of the evidence presented in (12), she 
might consider the simplest hypothesis first: in order to form a Yes-No question in English, 
process the corresponding declarative sentence word by word from left to right until you 
reach the first occurrence of the auxiliary. Then, move it to the front of the sentence. Now, 
consider the declarative sentence involving a relative clause (13a): 
 
(13a) The man who is here is tall  
 
If the child were to use the simplest hypothesis under consideration, she would turn (13a) into 
(13b) which is not a grammatical question of English: 
 
(13b) *Is the man who here is tall? 
 
The correct English question corresponding to the declarative (13a) is (13c): 
 
(13c) Is the man who is here tall? 
 
Consider now a more complex hypothesis that can account for both questions in (12) and 
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(13): process the declarative sentence from left to right by analyzing it into abstract phrases 
(such as NP, VP, etc.) until you reach the first auxiliary. Then, move it in front of the first NP 
of the sentence. Application of this rule to (13a) correctly yields (13c). Unlike the first 
hypothesis, the second hypothesis is what Chomsky calls a “structure-dependent” rule: it 
takes as input an abstract analysis of the sentence into grammatical constituents, not words. 
And it modifies the structure by moving a constituent. Now, Chomsky makes the empirical 
claim that in the course of acquiring knowledge of English, children never produce ill-formed 
questions such as (13b). Since structure-dependence is not a property of utterances that is 
directly observable, he concludes quite rationally that human children have innate knowledge 
of the fact that the rule for forming Yes-No questions in English is a structure-dependent rule. 
Hence, structure-dependence is part of UG. 
 In Chomsky‟s construal, the dispute between rationalists and empiricists raised by 
question (Q2) is not about innateness. It is about the task-specificity of UG, the initial state of 
the language faculty that, according to the rationalist story, allows a human child to acquire 
knowledge of her language on the basis of her access to linguistic evidence. Chomsky‟s 
argument based on the formation of simple Yes-No questions in English is a typical “poverty 
of the stimulus” argument. It was intended as a challenge to any claim that “general 
intelligence” is all that is required to acquire knowledge of the grammar of a language. For a 
defense of the claim that general intelligence can account for language acquisition, see e.g., 
Putnam (1980).   
At the Royaumont Conference, after Chomsky offered his “poverty of the stimulus” 
argument, one interesting exchange took place between the Piagetian developmental 
psychologist Bärbel Inhelder and the molecular biologist Jacques Monod. At the Conference, 
Jean Piaget and the Piagetians were arguing that the development of sensorimotor schemata 
can account for language acquisition. Monod pointed out that Piagetian theory should predict 
that children with a severe deficit in motor control (e.g., quadriplegics) should be severely 
 - 24 - 
retarded in language acquisition, if not prevented from acquiring language. Inhelder replied 
that the required motor ability may be restricted to e.g., eye motion. In effect, as was 
immediately pointed out by Jerry Fodor, Inhelder was implicitly conceding that all that is 
required by Piaget‟s view is that some motoric experience play a “triggering” role in language 
acquisition. Presumably, to recognize that some motoric experience plays a triggering role in 
language acquisition is consistent with Chomsky‟s conclusion from the poverty of the 
stimulus argument that UG is necessary for language acquisition. In retrospect, some twenty-
five years after the debate, it appears that offering the argument by the poverty of the stimulus 
in favor of the rationalist claim that UG is an innate and task-specific part of the initial state 
of the language faculty was, I think, the correct strategy for Chomsky to adopt. Furthermore, 
in the particular case of the Yes-No questions in English, since it depends on the empirical 
claim that English speaking children never come up with ill-formed questions such as (12b), 
the conclusion is testable and, as far as I know, it has not been refuted. 
 As I said above, questions (Q1) and (Q2) must satisfy different kinds of adequacy: the 
former must satisfy descriptive adequacy; the latter must satisfy explanatory adequacy. The 
search for descriptive adequacy and the search for explanatory adequacy pull in opposite 
directions: the former towards multiplicity of rule systems for different languages, the latter 
towards uniformity of the initial state of the language faculty. As Chomsky (2000: 7) puts it, 
“this tension […] has largely set the guidelines of research”. Early work in generative 
grammar emphasized the multiplicity of different rule systems specific to particular 
languages. Further elaboration and a great deal of empirical study of many different 
languages led to an approach labelled the “Principles and Parameters” framework that has 
dominated generative linguistics since the 1980‟s. On this approach, all languages turn out to 
be “cast to the same mold”. As Chomsky (2000: 8) puts it:  
 
we can think of the initial state of the language faculty as a fixed network connected to a switch 
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box; the network is constituted of the principles of language, while the switches are the options to 
be determined by experience. When the switches are set one way, we have Swahili; when they are 
set another way we have Japanese. Each possible human language is identified as a particular 
setting of the switches — a setting of parameters, in technical terminology. 
 
The ingenuity of generative linguists consists in sorting out the parameters from the general 
principles of the language faculty. On this view, human children do not have to learn the 
general principles of the language faculty. They know the general principles and their task is 
to fix the parameters of the particular language spoken by members of their community. 
Although as a non-linguist, I cannot truly judge, it seems to me that the Principles and 
Parameters framework has led to an enormous amount of discoveries about how languages 
around the world, though different from one another, are nonetheless “variations on a single 
theme”.  
 Now, on the assumption that the language faculty — a higher-order cognitive system 
that, in combination with linguistic experience, gives rise to grammatical knowledge of 
particular languages — is a specialized (i.e., modular) system within the human mind, the 
question arises of how it interacts with other systems of the human mind. In particular, the 
computations performed by the language faculty must be accessible to various systems of the 
mind required for the use of language, both for producing and understanding speech. At the 
very end of the 1990‟s, within the so-called “Minimalist” program, Chomsky has entertained 
the idea that the computations performed by the language faculty must meet “legibility 
conditions” imposed by e.g., the human sensorimotor system and the human conceptual 
system. The former must be able to read the phonetic representations generated by the 
language faculty in order to produce sounds. The latter must be able to take into account the 
semantic representations generated by the language faculty in order to derive inferences from 
linguistically coded information. So these “external” (i.e., non-linguistic) systems must be 
able to read the instructions delivered by the language faculty. In the last few years, within the 
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Minimalist program, the highly speculative question has arisen whether the language faculty 
can be seen as an “optimal” solution to the engineering problem of designing legibility 
conditions accessible to the external systems. I will return to this question at the very end of 
this paper. 
 At this stage, we can, I think, go back and clarify one important point of contention 
between Quine and Chomsky, namely Chomsky‟s rejection of Quine‟s assumption that in the 
study of a person‟s grammatical competence, only evidence related to the speaker‟s behavior 
(or to the behavior of people speaking the same language) can be a relevant source of 
evidence. Suppose we want to characterize the grammatical knowledge of an English speaker. 
Assuming the correctness of Chomsky‟s rationalist framework, there exists an initial state of 
the language faculty that allowed the English speaker to acquire knowledge of her language. 
The initial state is not “tuned” to the acquisition of English rather than any other particular 
language. Examination of a feature of Japanese grammar might compel us to attribute 
knowledge of some principle P to the initial state of the language faculty if e.g., it turns out 
that a Japanese child could not have extracted her knowledge of P from being exposed to 
samples of Japanese sentences (a typical instance of negative evidence in Japanese). If so, 
then knowledge of principle P by an English speaker should be attributed to the initial state of 
her language faculty as well, not to her particular knowledge of English.  
 
4. Domain-specificity and cognitive development 
 Chomsky‟s application of the argument by the poverty of the stimulus to language 
acquisition has had, I think, a twofold impact on one area of cognitive science: the study of 
the cognitive development of human infants. In fact, I think it is fair to say that the 
contemporary study of the cognitive development of human babies owes its existence to 
Chomsky‟s repeated use of the argument by the poverty of the stimulus. On the one hand, this 
argument strongly suggests that while human infants do not yet speak any natural languages, 
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they do not have to learn the basic principles underlying the grammars of all possible human 
languages. They only need to set the parameters of particular languages. In this sense, the 
argument by the poverty of the stimulus reveals that much of what a human being knows 
about language depends on the phylogenetic evolution of the species rather than on some 
ontogenetic process of learning. At least, the latter strongly supervenes on the former. On the 
other hand, it strongly suggests that basic cognitive structures are acquired on the basis of 
sharp innate constraints. In other words, a rich cognitive structure can only be acquired on the 
basis of a sharply modular (or task-specific) and presumably species-specific initial state (or 
genetically based cognitive endowment).  
 As noticed by Chomsky (1975: 17-20), unlike humans, rats cannot acquire knowledge 
of human languages. Nor for that matter can chimpanzees. Rats and human college students 
seem to be roughly comparable in maze running capacities. Humans, however, surpass rats in 
running mazes with numerical properties (where the rule is e.g., to select every prime 
numbered turn). Indeed, according to Chomsky‟s (1975, 1980, 1982, 2000) speculations, the 
language faculty and the capacity to deal with properties of natural numbers share some 
interesting features and are both distinctive of human cognition. They share the property of 
“discrete infinity” — a property which is “biologically isolated” in the sense that not many 
biological creatures acquire cognitive structures that exemplify it. As Chomsky (1997) 
recently wrote: 
 
Human language is based on an elementary property that also seems to be biologically isolated: the 
property of discrete infinity, which is exhibited in its purest form by the natural numbers 1, 2, 3,… 
Children do not learn this property of the number system. Unless the mind already possesses the 
basic principles, no amount of evidence could provide them; and they are completely beyond the 
intellectual range of other organisms. Similarly, no child has to learn that there are three word 
sentences and four word sentences, but no three-and-a half word sentences, and that it is always 
possible to construct a more complex one, with a definite form and meaning. Such knowledge must 
come to us from "the original hand of nature", in David Hume's phrase, as part of our biological 
endowment. 
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 As Chomsky (1975, 1980, 1982, 2000) likes to put it, there are “problems” that some 
creatures can solve in virtue of their cognitive capacities and others that they cannot: language 
acquisition and properties of natural numbers are such “problems” for human cognition. 
Problems for human cognition may be what Chomsky (ibid.) calls “mysteries” for rat 
cognition: they fall outside the reach of rats‟ cognitive capacities. The latter allow rats to 
solve maze-running problems. Now, Chomsky (ibid.) speculates that there must be 
“mysteries” for humans that fall outside the human “science forming” cognitive capacity just 
as language acquisition lies beyond the reach of rat cognition.  
 At this point, I would like to distinguish Chomsky‟s claim that there may be problems 
which members of any biological species are not equipped to raise and/or to solve from his 
additional hypothesis that there may exist in the human brain a “science forming capacity”. I 
think that Chomsky‟s distinction between problems and mysteries is in fact the basis of an 
important research program into the uniqueness of human cognition. But I do not think that it 
is very plausible to assume that there exists in the human brain a “science forming” cognitive 
capacity — not if UG is taken to be the model of such a cognitive capacity and UG is 
supposed to be species-specific, task specific and innate in the human brain. My reasons for 
scepticism about there being such a science forming cognitive capacity in the human brain 
stems from three related observations: first, unlike language acquisition, scientific theorizing 
is slow and difficult. It does not extend merely over a human individual‟s personal life but 
over generations of such personal lives. Second, unlike language acquisition, it requires 
explicit learning and teaching and also a special institutional and cultural seeting. Finally, 
unlike language learning, scientific theorizing involves important differences among  
different individuals.  
 In the last twenty-five years, the Chomskyan distinction between problems and 
mysteries has given rise to much fruitful research into the study of infants‟ cognitive 
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development. Much has been learnt about human infants‟ knowledge and reasoning in four 
basic domains other than language: naive physics, naive psychology (or mindreading), naive 
arithmetic and naive geometry. The main methodology used in these studies is the habituation 
paradigm whereby an infant is habituated to e.g. a visual stimulus until her perceptual 
attention declines. Then the infant is presented with a new stimulus and her looking time on 
the new stimulus is measured. On the assumption that an infant will look longer at an 
unexpected event than at an expected one, the measure of looking time provides a measure of 
infants‟ assumptions about what is going on around them. I will not review here the 
discoveries made by developmental psychologists about human infants‟ knowledge and 
reasoning in the areas of naive physics, naive psychology, naive arithmetic and naive 
geometry (see e.g., the work of Renée Baillargeon, Susan Carey, Alan Leslie, Elizabeth 
Spelke and others).  
 What I do want to emphasize though is that this research program is very much in line 
with Chomsky‟s view that the initial state of the human language faculty is a species-specific 
modular (or task-specific) higher-order innate cognitive structure. It is a higher-order 
cognitive structure because, in combination with linguistic experience, it gives rise to 
knowledge of the grammar of particular languages — a lower-order cognitive structure. 
Central to Chomsky‟s influence on the research into the cognitive capacities of human infants 
in cognitive domains other than language is Chomsky‟s assumption that the language faculty 
is modular or task-specific.  
 Chomsky‟s notion of modularity is interestingly different from Jerry Fodor‟s (1983) 
concept of modularity. First of all, Chomsky uses this notion to solve the “inductive” problem 
of language acquisition: how can a human child learn her language given the “poverty” of the 
stimulus? Fodor‟s notion of modularity is geared towards the solution of a different problem: 
the problem of providing in computational terms a principled distinction between belief-
formation and/or considered judgments (i.e., conceptual processes) and perceptual processes. 
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Unlike conceptual “central” processes, perceptual processes or “input systems” are modular 
in Fodor‟s sense.  
 Secondly, a computational mechanism is a system that converts inputs into outputs. 
Such a mechanism can be limited in two sorts of ways: it can be limited in the kinds of inputs 
it can process or analyze and it can be limited in the type of computations it can perform on 
the inputs. The language faculty (UG) in Chomsky‟s sense is domain-specific: it processes 
only linguistic stimuli. The visual system is domain-specific in this sense: it processes visual 
stimuli, not auditory or tactile stimuli. The paradigm of Fodor‟s perceptual input systems is 
the visual processing of an illusory display such as the Müller-Lyer illusion. Even though you 
know that the two line segments are equal, they look unequal: the segment whose arrows are 
converging looks longer than the segment whose arrows are diverging. The computational 
mechanism that gives rise to the visual illusion is encapsulated because it does not make use 
of the available information that the two segments are equal. Conversely, even though the two 
segments look unequal, your considered judgment will be that they are equal: central 
processes are “Quinean” (holistic) and “isotropic”. The output of the processing of 
informationally encapsulated input systems is only one of the factors on the basis of which the 
central processes reach their considered judgment. The Fodorian paradigm of central 
processes is scientific hypothesis formation where any available information can be used as 
relevant evidence.  
 Informational encapsulation and domain-specificity, though related, are nonetheless 
different properties of a cognitive structure or computational mechanism. In the tradition of 
generative grammar of the past twenty-five years, core knowledge of grammatical facts gives 
rise to intricate judgments illustrated by English sentences (14) and (10)-(11) (already 
discussed), which involve anaphoric dependence between a pronoun and its antecedent („she‟ 
and „Mary‟ in (10), „herself‟ and „Mary‟ in (11), „each other‟ and „we‟ in (14)): 
 
 - 31 - 
(10a) Mary said that she would come. 
(10b) She said that Mary would come. 
 
(11a) Mary expects to feed herself. 
(11b) John wonders who Mary expects to feed herself. 
 
(14a) We like each other. 
(14b) We expect each other to win. 
(14c) *We expect John to like each other. 
 
(14a) means that each of us likes the other. (14b) means that each of us expects the other to 
win. But (14c) is not a grammatical sentence with the meaning that each of us expects John to 
like the other. The point is that no mature English speaker has been taught such facts. 
Nonetheless, he or she knows them. Given the poverty of the stimulus argument, Chomsky‟s 
view is that an English speaker comes to know these facts and make the corresponding 
judgments in virtue of a task-specific, i.e., a domain-specific, not an informationally 
encapsulated, cognitive capacity (UG). Grammatical knowledge that underlies judgments of 
anaphoric dependency presumably cuts across the Fodorian distinction between central 
processes and input systems. So does presumably human infants‟ core knowledge of naive 
physics, naive psychology, naive arithmetic and naive geometry investigated by 
developmental psychologists. It is a domain-specific, not an informationally encapsulated, 
cognitive capacity.  
 On the assumption that I have provided evidence for my claim that Chomsky‟s work 
can legimitately be regarded as the single most important contribution to our current 
understanding of human language and the human mind, I now want to turn my attention to 
some of his views that stand in sharp contrast with the views of most philosophers of mind 
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and language who reject methodological dualism.  
 
5. The creative aspect of language use and naturalism 
 Most of Chomsky‟s polemics with philosophers of mind and language in the 1970‟s 
and the 1980‟s has been devoted to a criticism of what Chomsky (1980) calls “the bifurcation 
thesis”, i.e., the idea that there is a boundary between the natural sciences and the study of 
human language and the human mind. Importantly, cognitive science roughly sits at the 
boundary in question. Therefore, it is primarily concerned by the bifurcation thesis (or 
methodological dualism). As I mentioned earlier, Quine‟s thesis of the indeterminacy of 
radical translation is a sophisticated version of the bifurcation thesis. Another version is 
Searle‟s (1992) Connection Principle, according to which, unlike merely neurophysiological 
states and processes, genuinely mental states and processes must be “potentially accessible to 
consciousness”. If he were right, then most of the computational processes posited by 
cognitive science would fail to qualify as mental processes: cognitive science might be about 
the human brain, but not the human mind. The essence of methodological dualism lies in the 
assumption that, unlike the study of other natural phenomena, the study of language and mind 
is liable to a priori constraints to which the genuine natural sciences are not subject. As 
Chomsky (2000: 112) writes: 
 
[…] the natural sciences — whether the topic is the motion of the planets, the growth of an 
organism […] — are “first philosophy”. The idea is by now a commonplace with regard to physics 
[…]. But this standpoint is commonly regarded as inapplicable to cognitive science, linguistics in 
particular. Somewhere in-between, there is a boundary. Within that boundary, science is self-
justifying; the critical analyst seeks to learn about the criteria for rationality and justification from 
the study of scientific success. Beyond that boundary, everything changes; the critic applies 
independent criteria to sit in judgment over the theories advanced and the entities they postulate. 
This seems to be nothing more than a kind of “methodological dualism”, far more pernicious than 
the traditional metaphysical dualism, which was a scientific hypothesis, naturalistic in spirit.  
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 Evidently, Chomsky abhors the stance of methodological dualism: since he 
contributed so much to the contemporary scientific study of the human language faculty that 
in turn made cognitive science possible, this is quite understandable. Furthermore, I find his 
persistent arguments against “double standards” quite convincing. From the standpoint of a 
naturalistic inquiry, however, the question that arises is: What to make of his view that 
methodological dualism is “far more pernicious than the traditional metaphysical dualism, 
which was a scientific hypothesis, naturalistic in spirit”? In what sense was metaphysical 
dualism a scientific hypothesis, naturalistic in spirit?  
 Recall first Chomsky‟s question (Q3): How is a speaker‟s knowledge of the grammar 
of her language put to use in actual speech (both in production and in comprehension)? 
Chomsky would no doubt concede that some scientific progress has been made in the 
understanding of the processes whereby a person uses various performance systems to 
produce and/or process linguistic sounds. He would, however, sharply distinguish these 
“problems” from the “mystery” of “the creative aspect of language use”. With regard to both 
speakers‟ knowledge of the grammar of their language and the computational properties of 
the language faculty, intelligible explanatory theories are available. But with respect to 
normal language use, we “are still in the dark”. The reason normal language use is a deep 
mystery is that it is: “unbounded; not determined by external stimuli or internal state; not 
random but coherent and appropriate to situations, though not caused by them; evoking 
thoughts that the hearer might have expressed the same way” (Chomsky, 1994: 156). This 
characterization of normal language use as a deep mystery sounds very Cartesian indeed: in 
fact, it is the root of Chomsky‟s claim that metaphysical (or ontological) substance dualism of 
the Cartesian variety was “a scientific hypothesis, naturalistic in spirit”. In particular, one may 
be legitimately puzzled by the claim that normal language use is not caused.  
 Normal language use is quite typical of human intentional behavior: it exemplifies the 
cluster of properties characteristic of human intentional action. Chomsky accepts the 
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Cartesian view that human intentional behavior differs from the behavior of anything else in 
the physical world because humans have minds. On his view as on Descartes‟, there is a 
fundamental divide between minds and machines: “no artefact could exhibit the normal 
properties of language use”. On Chomsky‟s view, unlike what people know, what they do 
may not fall within the cognitive reach of the human “science forming capacity”. As we saw 
above, like Descartes, Chomsky takes “discrete infinity” to be a fundamental property of 
human minds. Remarkably, Chomsky also accepts the Cartesian view that human intentional 
action is radically unlike any machine‟s behavior. Chomsky (1980: 79) says of human 
intentional action that it is “indeterminate” because it involves “questions of will and choice 
that will remain shrouded in mystery”. Although there are available explanatory theories of 
what humans know in some areas (e.g., language), an account of people‟s grammatical 
knowledge still leaves the question of “how they talk” wide open. On Chomsky‟s (1988: 5-6) 
Cartesian view, humans are merely “incited and inclined” to act:  
 
their behavior may be predictable, in that they will tend to do what they are incited and inclined to 
do, but they are nonetheless free, and uniquely so, in that they need not do what they are incited 
and inclined to do. If, for example, I were to take out a machine gun, point it menacingly at you 
and command you to shout „Heil Hitler‟, you might do it if you had reason to believe I was a 
homicidal maniac, but you would have a choice in the matter, even if that choice is not exercised 
[…] A machine, in contrast, acts in accordance with its internal configuration and external 
environment, with no choice. The creative aspect of language use was often referred as the most 
striking example of this fundamental aspect of human nature.  
 
 Although it is true that Chomsky is more sympathetic than most contemporary 
physicalist writers to the motivations of Cartesian dualism, I do not mean to suggest that 
Chomsky subscribes to ontological dualism. In fact, Chomsky expresses scepticism about any 
claim that anything might be “the mark of the mental”. He uses “mental” on a par with the 
“optical”, the “electrical” or the “chemical” to demarcate some natural physical phenomena 
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for which one wants to uncover some deep empirical generalizations. It would make no more 
sense to look for a criterion of the mental than to look for a criterion of the optical, the 
electrical or the chemical. Nor should one seek any metaphysical boundary between mental 
phenomena and other physical phenomena. 
 One can, I think, go along with Chomsky when he emphasizes the gap between what 
people know and what they do or how they act. The question is whether the gap is ontological 
or epistemological. It is one thing to say that an account of what people know will fall short of 
what they do. It is another to say that human beings‟ actions is “indeterminate”. When 
Chomsky says of human intentional action that it is “indeterminate”, it is not absolutely clear 
whether he means that it is uncaused — whether it lacks any cause — or whether the causal 
chain leading to human intentional action is bound to fall outside the human science forming 
cognitive capacity. Whatever Chomsky‟s exact position is in this respect, we have located one 
basic point of disagreement between him and naturalistically inclined philosophers. They 
assume and he denies that the problem of “mental causation” is a legitimate problem, not a 
“mystery” — where the problem of mental causation is the problem of how an individual‟s 
thought (or mental representation) can cause her to produce a physical motion in virtue of its 
content. 
 The Cartesian assumption that human intentional action — particularly, normal 
language use — is a mystery (not a problem) led Descartes to embrace ontological dualism. 
According to Cartesian substance dualism, human intentional actions are unlike the behavior 
of anything else in the physical universe and human minds are unlike bodies. Whereas the 
essential property of minds is thought, bodies are extended in space and they obey physical 
laws, i.e., the principles of mechanics. According to the mechanical philosophy, no causal 
interactions between physical bodies can occur at a distance. According to Chomsky, given 
the assumption that human intentional action is unlike the behavior of anything else in the 
physical world, ontological or metaphysical dualism was, unlike contemporary 
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methodological dualism, a rational (if not a scientific) conclusion.  
 In many of his recent writings, Chomsky (1994, 2000) has capitalized on this 
interpretation of Cartesian ontological dualism to draw a picture of the mind/body problem 
that is radically at odds with most contemporary physicalist discussions of the problem. Most 
contemporary physicalists ask the question: How can a purely physical system exemplify 
intentionality and/or consciousness? How can intentionality and/or consciousness arise in a 
purely physical system? According to Chomsky (2000), the success of Newtonian physics 
destroyed the Cartesian mechanical philosophy. By acknowledging gravitational action at a 
distance between physical particles, Newtonian physics showed that the physical universe — 
and hence, physical bodies — were beyond the explanatory power of the mechanical 
philosophy. In the process, “the Cartesian theory of mind […] was unaffected […], but the 
theory of body was demonstrated to be untenable. To put it differently, Newton eliminated the 
problem of [what the philosopher Gilbert Ryle called] „the ghost in the machine‟ by 
exorcising the machine; the ghost was unaffected” (Chomsky, 2000: 84). In fact, according to 
Chomsky, not only did the advent of Newtonian action at a distance destroy the physical view 
presupposed by the Cartesian ontological dualistic picture, but it also deprived the mind/body 
problem of its basic presupposition, i.e., that it makes any sense to try to reduce the mind to 
some well-defined concept of the physical, since no such concept is available.  
 Since Brentano, many philosophers have taken intentionality to be the mark of the 
mental. Whether they take intentionality or consciousness (like Searle, 1992 and Strawson, 
1994) to be constitutive features of the mental, most physicalists think that the mind/body 
problem is a deep but genuine metaphysical issue because of the “explanatory gap” between 
the mental and the physical. If one takes intentionality as a crucial feature of mental 
representations, then one will be led to ask how physical structures in the brain can have 
intentionality or content. Physicalists assume that mental states (and/or representations) are 
brain states. But they divide over whether the fact that a brain state possesses content or 
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intentionality can play a causal role. Can content be “causally efficacious” ? Intentional 
realists say “Yes”. Intentional irrealists say “No”. In other words, once the gap between 
intentionality and things devoid of intentionality has been appreciated, one faces a basic 
choice: one can assume that current physics (together with the rest of the natural sciences) 
provides the basic outline of the physical. Or one can deny it. If one takes the former option, 
then one can endorse physicalism and deny various features of the mental. This is what 
several physicalist writers do to varying degrees. The eliminative materialists who are 
intentional irrealists (e.g., Churchland) claim that no mental property has ever been 
instantiated. Other intentional irrealists, who (like Quine, Davidson or Dennett) subscribe to 
an instrumentalist and/or an interpretationist doctrine of the mental, put into question the 
reality of various mental phenomena and properties. The other way to go would be to embrace 
idealism.  
 Chomsky claims that since the demise of the mechanical philosophy, the mind/body 
problem cannot even be meaningfully raised. He points out that our concept of the physical is 
constantly evolving with the development of the physical sciences. On his view, since the 
Newtonian demolition of the mechanical philosophy, we do not know how to define the 
physical. So much so that no meaningful question of the reduction of the mental to the 
physical can arise. What a naturalistic inquiry into the mental should lead us to expect, on his 
view, is a “unification” of the cognitive science with the core natural sciences, not a reduction 
of the former to the latter. Perhaps unification will not occur until major changes affect the 
core natural sciences themselves. 
 Chomsky is no doubt right to draw our attention to the fact that we have come to 
accept whatever entities and processes the physical sciences posit however commonsense 
might find them offensive. Until or unless basic physics completes its job of providing a full 
and final characterization of the ultimate constituents of the universe, we do not possess a 
final concept of the physical. Nonetheless, physicalist philosophers of mind might still have 
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reasons to assume that minds raise special metaphysical issues with respect to anything else 
the physical sciences have so far found reasons to postulate. Consciousness notwithstanding, 
intentionality is puzzling. Assuming that what some philosophers call “primitive” 
intentionality — as opposed to the “derived” intentionality of artefacts — requires the 
evolution of such complex biological structures as nervous systems, still the question how 
brains could be minds remains a mystery above the physical mysteries derived from the 
Newtonian introduction of action at a distance. The mystery of how brains could be minds is 
— again, consciousness notwithstanding — the mystery of how anything biological, chemical 
and physical could give rise to representations. The naturalism of physicalist philosophers of 
mind drives them to ask the question: in virtue of which of its non-semantic properties could a 
brain construct mental representations? Assuming that a mental representation is a brain state, 
the question is: Which of the non-semantic properties of a brain state could account for the 
fact that it can also exemplify content or a semantic property?  
 The reason, I take it, Chomsky thinks this question is not meaningful is that no 
“scientific” sense can be made of the notion of content or the semantic property of a mental 
representation. Although Chomsky has more than anybody else contributed to the 
construction of “computational representational” (C-R) theories of the mind, he seems to 
think that we should refrain from asking the question: What do mental representations stand 
for? What do they represent? I now turn to this question. 
  
6. Internalism in semantics and evolution 
 As Figure 1 made clear, on Chomsky‟s view of grammar, the syntax of a natural 
language generates linguistic structures step by step until these structures can be interpreted 
respectively by phonology and the semantic part of grammar. Hence, on this view, meanings 
and sounds are symmetrical: the former provide instructions for pronunciation, the latter 
provide instructions for drawing inferences.  
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 In many of his recent writings, Chomsky calls “I-language” (as opposed to E-
language) a speaker‟s knowledge of the internal computational procedure that allows her to 
produce and interpret expressions of her language. “I-language” contrasts with “E-language” 
as both internal contrasts with external and intensional contrasts with extensional. In the 
following, the internal vs. external contrast will be most relevant. An I-language is internal in 
the sense that it is a procedure represented in a speaker‟s (and/or a hearer‟s) brain for 
generating well-formed expressions. By contrast, an E-language is external in the sense that it 
is a set of expressions generated by an internal procedure. An I-language is intensional in the 
sense that, among several extensionally equivalent characterizations of the procedure that 
generates an E-language, it corresponds to one particular procedure represented in a speaker‟s 
brain.  
Thanks to the development of generative grammar, rich testable theories of syntax and 
phonology are presently available. Insofar as such theories are computational theories, they 
are internalist theories. They are internalist in the sense that all of the relevant computations 
go on within a speaker‟s mind or brain. Phonological and syntactic computations supervene 
on a speaker‟s brain, not on the relations between the speaker‟s brain and his or her 
environment. The former supervene on the latter in the sense that Chomskyan linguists 
assume that no phonological and/or syntactic information would be computed unless some 
physical, chemical and physiological processes would take place in the speaker‟s brain and if 
and when such physical processes do take place, then the phonological and/or syntactic 
information is being computed by the speaker.
5
 The debate between internalism and 
externalism is about whether only brain processes (or processes internal to an individual‟s 
brain) underlie a given cognitive achievement or whether properties instantiated in the 
speaker‟s environment too are relevant. According to computationalism, the environment may 
be relevant to fixing the phonological and syntactic parameters of the language spoken around 
                                                 
5 On supervenience, see Kim (1993).  
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a child. But once fixed, the syntactic and phonological computations operate within the 
speaker‟s brain alone.  
 The success of internalist phonology and syntax raises the question whether all of the 
scientific study of language and mind is or ought to be similarly internalist. In particular, the 
question arises whether semantics can or should be internalist. Although Chomsky (2000: 
156) recognizes that internalism is not “entailed” by methodological naturalism, he 
nonetheless thinks that internalism is without a “realistic alternative”. What Chomsky calls 
“I-linguistics” is predicated on the assumption that the study of I-meanings ought to proceed 
in parallel with the study of I-sounds.  
 Most externalist philosophers of mind and language disagree with Chomsky about 
semantics. On the face of it, semantic properties and phonological properties seem to be very 
different properties of sounds. Much contemporary philosophy of mind can be said to stem 
from some of the crucial differences between meanings and the acoustic properties of sounds. 
 Consider an example of Fred Dretske‟s (1988): a soprano produces an upper sound in 
the course of singing an Opera and the sound shatters glass. Suppose the sound had both a 
meaning and an acoustic property. Surely, the sound shattered the glass in virtue of its 
acoustic property, not in virtue of its meaning. Unlike the acoustic property, the meaning is 
not an intrinsic property of the sound. Arguably, the sound could have had a different 
meaning or no meaning at all and still be the same sound. Presumably, the event of the 
producing of the sound would not have been the same event had the sound lacked its 
meaning. However, the sound could be the same sound if it lacked its semantic property, not 
if it lacked its acoustic property. So the sound‟s acoustic property is an intrinsic property of 
the sound. And it may be causally efficacious in the process whereby the production of the 
sound shattered the glass. Indeed, it is presumably because its acoustic property is one of its 
intrinsic property that it was a causally efficacious property of the sound in the process 
whereby it shattered the glass. Conversely, it is because the meaning is one of the sound‟s 
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extrinsic property that the meaning seems devoid of causal efficacy in the shattering of the 
glass. On the view of most externalist philosophers of mind and language, the meaning of a 
symbol (whether linguistic or mental) is not one of its intrinsic property: it is both relational 
and historical. As Putnam (1974) famously said, “meanings are not in the head”. 
No doubt, phonological properties are not acoustic properties. Unlike the latter, the 
former are not intrinsic properties of speech sounds: the former are extracted from the latter. 
Neither LFs nor phonological properties are intrinsic properties of speech sounds. As I 
pointed out earlier, on Chomsky‟s view, rules yielding LFs and phonological rules (yielding 
PFs) are really syntactic rules; they operate in parallel upon S-structures, which are delivered 
by the transformational component of a grammar. As I argued above, however, LFs are not 
genuinely semantic representations: rather, they are the output of such syntactic rules as 
Quantifier Raising (QR), which (I claimed) are extended transformations.  
Phonological properties, therefore, are like syntactic properties, not like acoustic 
properties. Unlike physical (or geometrical) properties, syntactic properties are higher-order 
properties of symbols. Arguably, unlike the syntactic property of a symbol, and like the 
acoustic property of a sound, its shape is one of its intrinsic physical or geometrical 
properties. For example, in propositional calculus, the truth-functional connective for 
conjunction may assume three different shapes: “&”, “.” and “”. Thus, three distinct 
physical symbols with different geometrical shapes have one and the same syntactic property 
that can be stated by the following rule: if “p” and “q” are well-formed formulae, then so is “p 
& q”. What this suggests is that the syntactic property of a symbol is one of its higher-order 
(functional) properties. A symbol can be said to instantiate the above syntactic property just 
in case it instantiates one of the three mentioned geometrical properties. In general, something 
exemplifies a given functional (higher-order) property in virtue of the fact that it exemplifies 
one within a disjunctive class of basic physical properties. Hence, I submit that a symbol 
exemplifies either a syntactic or a phonological property in virtue of the fact that it 
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exemplifies one of a disjunctive class of basic physical (either geometrical or acoustic) 
properties. 
 Granted, syntactic and phonological properties are functional, hence not basic 
physical, properties of speech sounds. Still, there is an important difference between syntactic 
or phonological properties and meaning (or semantic) properties. To say that syntactic and 
phonological properties of a symbol are functional properties is to say that they supervene on 
basic intrinsic physical (geometrical or acoustic) properties of symbols. Arguably, although 
they are not basic physical properties of a symbol, syntactic and phonological properties are 
internal properties of a symbol. According to externalism, however, meaning (or semantic) 
properties of symbols do not supervene upon their basic intrinsic properties. Meaning (or 
semantic) properties of symbols are not internal properties: they are both extrinsic and 
historical. They are extrinsic because they supervene on properties instantiated in the 
symbol‟s environment. According to externalists, nothing can be a symbol and have a 
meaning unless it results from some historical process or other. The meaning of a symbol is 
like the authenticity of a work of art or like the economic value of a 100 French francs bill: 
the latter do not supervene on the intrinsic properties of either a canvas or a piece of paper. 
They depend on the historical relations between the canvas and an artist or between the piece 
of paper and agents working for some governmental agency.  
  On the one hand, Chomsky himself has not expressed views on the metaphysical issue 
of the extrinsic nature of meaning. On the other hand, unlike Chomsky, most philosophers of 
mind and language take truth and reference to be central semantic notions. Chomsky often 
points out that much more is known and understood about referential dependence than about 
reference. Speakers of natural languages have subtle and intricate intuitions about the 
relations between an anaphoric pronoun and its antecedent (as illustrated by (10), (11) and 
(14)). Consider some of Chomsky‟s examples of such complex referential dependencies in 
(15): 
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(15a) The bank burned down and then it moved across the street. 
(15b) The bank, which had raised the interest rate, was destroyed by fire. 
(16) The book that he is planning will weigh at least five pounds.  
 
In one clause of (15), „the bank‟ refers to a concrete building. In the other clause, the pronoun 
coreferential with „the bank‟ refers to an abstract institution. In (16), the pronoun „that‟ 
corefers with „the book‟. The pronoun refers to some content and its antecedent refers to a 
physical object that is the vehicle of the content referred to by the pronoun. In such cases, the 
anaphoric dependency of the pronoun on its antecedent is preserved in spite of the shift from 
the concrete to the abstract entity being referred to. Chomsky (2000: 62) also points out that 
there are rich internal semantic relations between some lexical items. So, for example, (17a) 
cannot be true unless (17b) is: 
 
(17a) John persuaded Bob to leave. 
(17b) Bob decided to leave. 
 
Any English speaker knows these facts. The connection between the meanings of the verbs 
persuade and decide  seems “analytic” in the sense that the inferential relations between 
(17a) and (17b) seem to hold in virtue of the meanings of the words, not in virtue of anything 
in the world. A speaker who knows that if (17a) is true, then so is (17b), seems to know this 
fact in  virtue of knowing the grammar of English, not in virtue of any of his beliefs about the 
world. It seems so unless one heroically tries to argue that persuasions and decisions are 
events or properties in the world such that it is a necessary (metaphysical) truth that if (17a) is 
true, then so is (17b) — not in virtue of what „persuade‟ and „decide‟ mean but in virtue of 
what persuasions and decisions are. I would tend to agree with Chomsky that it sounds more 
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plausible to assume that the inference from (17a) to (17b) holds in virtue of the concepts 
expressed by the English words „persuade‟ and „decide‟ than in virtue of a metaphysical 
dependency of instances of persuasions upon instances of decisions in the world. 
  As Chomsky (2000: 39) notes, referential dependency of the sort exemplified in (14) 
and (15) and analytic connections of the sort exemplified in (17) are internalist for they can be 
thought of as a kind of “logical syntax” for natural languages (as Carnap would have said). 
Unlike referential dependence and analytic inferential patterns, which involve a relation 
between two lexical items and are therefore internal to language, truth and reference are 
semantic properties of sentences and words that depend or supervene on their relations to 
things in the world. In fact, the truth (or falsity) of a sentence depends on the way some of the 
words contained in the sentence refer to things in the world.  
  Much of Chomsky‟s scepticism about externalist semantics is a scepticism about the 
possibility of making any scientific use of truth and reference in linguistic semantics. His 
scepticism about truth and reference in turns seems to stem from some deep metaphysical 
puzzles that he likes to raise about the existence of things in the world for words to refer to. In 
several places, Chomsky (2000: 37, 126) argues that names of cities, e.g., „London‟ can refer 
both to something concrete and abstract, animate and inanimate as in (18): 
 
(18) London is so unhappy, uggly and polluted that it should be destroyed and rebuilt 100 
miles away. 
 
Chomsky (2000: 126) is surely right that the identity of the thing referred to by simple words 
(e.g. proper names of cities) depends on a “highly intricate space of human interests and 
concerns [and that] judgments can be rather delicate, involving factors that have barely been 
explored” (Chomsky 2000: 126). As example (18) shows, cities have the strange property that 
they can be destroyed and rebuilt elsewhere. The question is whether from the fact that it is 
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very hard if not impossible to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of individuation for 
things in the world to be referred to by linguistic expressions, one ought to conclude that there 
are no things in the world (e.g., cities) for linguistic expressions to refer to and be true of? If 
so, then it might follow that semantic relations between words and things in the world are not 
suitable for scientific linguistic purposes.  
 The argument from the lack of necessary and sufficient conditions of individuation for 
things in the world to be referred to by linguistic expressions to the conclusion that truth and 
reference are dispensable for scientific linguistic purposes does not seem to me like a 
convincing argument. First of all, Chomsky‟s internalist tendencies push him in the direction 
of dropping truth and reference (which are externalist semantic properties and relations of 
words) in favor of purely internal relations between linguistic expressions such as referential 
dependency and inferential relations. Referential dependency, however, seems to presuppose 
that the antecedent of an anaphoric expression possesses a reference. Otherwise, it is hard to 
see what the anaphoric expression would inherit its reference from. Inferential relations or 
entailments seem to presuppose some notion of truth. The sentence „London is pretty‟ 
presumably entails the sentence „A city is pretty‟ or „There is a pretty city‟. But the inference 
will not go through unless the sentence „London is a city‟ is true (or expresses a truth). 
Similarly, to say of the entailment from (17a) to (17b) that it is analytic is to say that if (17a) 
is true, so is (17b) and that the conditional holds in virtue of the rules of language. Entailment 
is a relation between truths (or true propositions). Secondly, Chomsky would certainly not 
want to give up the semantic concepts of truth and reference in general. He certainly would be 
appalled at the idea that reference and truth are inapplicable to e.g., scientific theories in 
linguistics and cognitive science. But he would probably want to distinguish the fact that they 
are applicable to any scientific theory from their suitability for linguistic semantics.  
 From the fact that it is hard if not impossible to provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the individuation of most things in the world that are referred to by linguistic 
 - 46 - 
expressions (e.g., cities), I would not conclude that truth and reference are dispensable from 
linguistic semantics. Nor would I conclude that there are no things in the world for linguistic 
expressions to refer to. I would rather conclude that most things in the world which are 
referred to by ordinary linguistic expressions are not suited for a scientific ontology. In other 
words, cities might not be the kinds of things about which we could expect deep scientific 
generalizations.  
 Furthermore, Chomsky‟s commitment to internalism is not restricted to the study of 
language. It extends to psychology in general. In particular, Chomsky (2000: 160-2) 
subscribes to an internalist interpretation of computational theories of vision such as Marr‟s 
theories. According to the internalist interpretation, computational-representational (C-R) 
theories of visual perception posit various levels of representation related by computational 
operations. As Chomsky (2000: 23) puts it, “in the study of determination of structure from 
motion, it is immaterial whether the external event is successive arrays of flashes on a 
tachistoscope that yield the visual experience of a cube rotating in space, or an actual rotating 
cube, or stimulation of the retina, or optic nerve, or visual cortex”. By examining Chomsky‟s 
internalist views of visual perception, we come to understand both the gap between his 
naturalism and the naturalism of most philosophers of mind who are externalists and the roots 
of his disagreement with most evolutionary psychologists (such as Cosmides & Tooby, 
Gigerenzer, Pinker or Sperber).  
 Some externalist philosophers of visual perception (e.g., McDowell 1982, 1994, 
Putnam, 1994), who subscribe to a view they call “disjunctivism”, claim that, unlike veridical 
visual perceptions, visual hallucinations are not genuine visual experiences, for in a 
hallucination, the mind is not presented with a mind-independent fact involving a mind-
independent object. Disjunctivism is an extreme version of an externalist account of visual 
experience. Less extreme (and to my view, less controversial) externalist accounts of visual 
experience (such as Dretske‟s 1995 and Tye‟s 1995) would argue first that visual experience 
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depends on the function of the visual system and second that the function of the visual system 
has itself arisen as a result of the historical process of phylogenetic evolution by natural 
selection. On this externalist view, it is the function of the visual system to detect or pick out 
the visual attributes of objects (e.g., shape, size, texture, motion, and so on) that have been 
instantiated in the “normal environment” in which the human visual system has evolved. 
Natural selection favored animals with such visual abilities. On this view then, although a 
visual hallucination may be a genuine visual experience, still it is a case of misperception. On 
this view, it is not the function of the visual system to hallucinate. The function of the visual 
system is to detect properties that are and were instantiated by real physical objects in a 
“normal” environment. Hallucinations, however, may nonetheless be visual experiences 
because the visual system may fail to fulfill its function.  
 According to most naturalistic so-called „teleosemantic‟ theories of mental content 
(see Dretske, 1988, Jacob, 1997, Millikan, 1993, Neander 1995) — not merely naturalistic 
theories of perceptual content —, a mental representation derives its content from the 
evolutionary function of the mechanism that produces the representation. The mechanism in 
turn derives its function from its evolutionary history: it possesses a function because it 
results from the process of natural selection. I say „most‟ naturalistic theories of mental 
content because one proeminent naturalistic account — namely Fodor‟s (1987, 1990, 1994) 
— is not a teleosemantic account: it is a purely informational or correlational account. 
However, unlike Chomsky and like teleosemanticists, Fodor‟s purely informational account 
takes the problem of misrepresentation seriously enough so that his “Asymmetrical Nomic 
Dependency Condition” is precisely designed to solve it.  
 It is, I think, important to understand why Chomsky disagrees with externalist 
accounts of content — in particular, with evolutionary teleosemantic externalist accounts. On 
Chomsky‟s view, talk of „misperception‟, „failure to represent‟ an object and biological 
functions are mere metaphors or façons de parler. On his view, most evolutionary 
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assumptions according to which it may be the evolutionary function of a sensory or a 
cognitive mechanism to process information and/or to perform computations are part of 
common sense, not science. Evolutionary considerations of this sort belong to the “informal 
presentation” of the computational theory, not to the theory proper. They can play no genuine 
theoretical role.  
 As Chomsky (2000: 162) writes, “the critique of internalism […] gains no force from 
the observation that, in normal environments, internal processes are reliably correlated with 
distal properties (objects boundaries, and so on)”. According to externalist philosophers of 
mind, the problem of misperception or misrepresentation is a genuine problem. On their view, 
there is a fact of the matter as to whether a visual experience is a case of misperception and 
whether a mental representation is a misrepresentation or whether it is veridical. According to 
most externalist philosophers, sensory and cognitive mechanisms can deliver 
misrepresentations because they can misfunction. They could not misfunction unless they had 
a function which they derive from their evolutionary history. According to externalist 
philosophers, there is a fact of the matter as to whether a representation is veridical or a 
misrepresentation because a representation derives its content from its function. And a 
mechanism that delivers a representation in turn derives its function from a selectional 
process. In Chomsky‟s (2000: 45, 162) view, there are no such facts of the matter: “failure” to 
represent objects and properties in an individual‟s environment is merely our commonsense 
“way of describing some human end that we impose for reasons unrelated to naturalistic 
inquiry, much as in the case of the failure of a comet to hit Jupiter”. There are no more facts 
of the matter as to whether a mental representation is a case of misrepresentation than there is 
to the question of whether machines think or airplanes and people fly. Much of the 
disagreement between Chomsky‟s internalism and externalist philosophers of mind, therefore, 
depends upon what Chomsky takes to be a genuine scientific explanation. Crucial to 
Chomsky‟s internalism is the distinction between the computational theory (of either 
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language or visual perception) and the evolutionary adaptationist considerations that the 
theorist might add to the theory. Unlike the theory proper, the latter is part of common sense.  
 It is at least controversial whether instances of misrepresentation on the part of a 
biological system having “primitive” intentionality ought to be treated on a par either with the 
case of the motion of a comet that lacks any function or with the case of an artefact that lacks 
primitive intentionality and whose function has been ascribed by an engineer with primitive 
intentionality. One can agree with Chomsky that it is a mere convenience to describe the lack 
of collision between a comet and Jupiter as a „failure‟. One can also perhaps agree with 
Chomsky that there is no clear fact of the matter whether people fly or machines think. But 
from these concessions, it does not, it seems to me, follow that there is no fact of the matter as 
to whether a mental representation is veridical or not. Nor should one conclude that whether a 
cognitive mechanism possesses a biological function is a mere convenience relative to human 
concerns and interests. It is also surprising that Chomsky should describe evolutionary 
assumptions based on natural selection as part of common sense or as the informal part of a 
theory (of either vision or language). One can indeed distinguish the purely computational 
component of a theory of either vision or language from any evolutionary assumption. But the 
latter, it seems to me, are not really part of common sense. Neither the concept of natural 
selection nor the concept of adaptation are common sense biological concepts. They are 
theoretical concepts and are part of biological evolutionary science.   
 Here, we reach, I think, a pair of assumptions that are crucial to Chomsky‟s overall 
picture of science, the first of which I shall call the Galilean assumption. Chomsky has always 
thought that the goal of cognitive science is to adopt what borrowing Husserl‟s expression, 
Steven Weinberg has called the “Galilean style”, i.e., to construct “abstract mathematical 
models of the universe to which at least the physicists give a higher degree of reality than they 
accord the ordinary world of sensation” (see Chomsky, 1980: 8). There is little doubt that 
Chomsky‟s model for linguistics and cognitive science is theoretical physics. Of course, 
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Chomsky is well aware that the study of human cognitive structure cannot have the same 
generality as physical laws that are true of anything physical in the universe. However, 
linguistics and cognitive science should aim, in the Galilean style, for the same explanatory 
depth as theoretical physics: the goal of linguistics and cognitive science should be to make 
the appropriate idealizations that will lead to the discovery of unexpected principles that will 
be as removed from the empirical evidence, as are physical laws.  
 This Galilean assumption leads Chomsky (1997), I believe, to downplay the role of 
natural selection in evolution. In several places, Chomsky has recognized the tremendous 
evolutionary advantages provided by the language faculty. However, he seems quite sceptical 
of the explanatory power of evolutionary arguments based on natural selection. Arguably, 
“from the Big Bang to the evolution of large molecules, design results from the operation of 
physical law”. According to Darwinian assumptions, the evolution of complex biological 
systems involves in addition the action of natural selection. On Chomsky‟s picture, the 
evolution of complex biological systems must arise from a complex interplay between natural 
selection and the framework or constraints imposed by physical laws. As Chomsky (1999) 
puts it, “natural selection can‟t work in a vacuum; it has to work within a range of options 
[…] and those options are given by physical law and historical contingency”. In fact, 
Chomsky wants to maximize the contribution of physical law and minimize the role of 
historical contingency, adaptation and natural selection in his account of the evolution of 
complex biological systems. Arguably, Chomsky (1999) belongs to a distinguished tradition 
including notably the theoretical biologist D‟Arcy Thompson whose aim was to emphasize 
the role of biophysical and topological constraints in evolution. In fact Chomsky (1999: 18) 
links the underestimation of the role of physical constraints in evolution to a return to 
Skinner‟s behaviorism:  
 
He (Skinner) thought it was an argument for his radical behaviorism, that it works like unstructured 
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natural selection: so the pigeon carries out any possible behavior and you reinforce the one you 
want, and you get pigeons playing ping-pong, etc. He argued this is the same logic as natural 
selection, which is true, but what he missed is the fact that natural selection requires a structured 
environment, structured entities, and the conditions imposed by natural law, and the same is true of 
the pigeon. So, it is the same logic and the same mistake for both.  
 
 Chomsky (1997, 1999) is urging us to think of the evolution of complex biological 
systems not so much on the model of the distribution of dark and light moths or the neck of 
the giraffe as on the model of the sphericity of breaking cells in mitosis or the polyhedral 
shape of the shells of viruses. Unlike the former, the latter clearly depends on deep physical 
laws, not so much on opportunistic responses of natural selection. One can, I think, accept 
Chomsky‟s point that natural selection cannot work in a vacuum without deriving the 
conclusion that natural selection lacks explanatory force. It is one thing to point out that 
natural selection cannot begin to explain why the behavior of human beings falls under the 
law of universal gravitation. It is something else to argue that natural selection works in 
tandem with constraints provided by physical and chemical laws. The latter of course 
recognizes that some biological traits are being exemplified as a result of natural selection. 
And it is an empirical issue which do and which do not.  
As Chomsky (1980a) has written,  
 
consider the human ability to handle fairly deep properties of the number system. I suppose that 
this ability is genetically determined for humans, though it is hard to imagine that it contributed to 
differential reproduction. But we need not suppose that this is a miracle, if true. These skills may 
well have arisen as a concomitant of structural properties of the brain that developed for other 
reasons. Suppose that there was a selection for bigger brains, more cortical surface, hemispheric 
specialization for analytic processing, or many other structural properties that may be imagined. 
The brain that evolved might well have all sorts of special properties that are not individually 
selected; there would be no miracle in this, but only the normal workings of evolution. We have no 
idea, at present, how physical laws apply when 1010 neurons are placed in an object the size of a 
basketball, under the special conditions that arose during human evolution.  
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Here, Chomsky argues that it is conceivable that human numerical abilities might have arisen 
without being directly selected. Similarly, he might want to maintain that the language faculty 
might not be the direct result of natural selection. It is presumably easier to imagine that the 
language faculty “contributed to differential reproduction” among members of a species as 
social as human beings than the ability to handle deep properties of the number system. 
Arguably, Chomsky is thereby endorsing a modest version of what is called by evolutionary 
biologists “exaptation”, or a modest “exaptive” explanation of the evolution of human 
numerical abilities and, by extension, of the language faculty. Chomsky‟s view is a modest 
version of exaptation in the sense that, by pointing out that we lack insight into the physical 
constraints under which natural selection must have operated, he makes a case for the view 
that it is consistent with the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection to assume that 
human numerical abilities have arisen through some evolutionary process without being the 
direct target of natural selection. In other words, the alternative is not: either human numerical 
abilities were directly the result of natural selection; or they arose out of a miracle. It is 
modest in the sense that commitment to full-blown exaptation would commit him to the claim 
that some piece of brain machinery (e.g., Broca‟s area) was selected for some function  (e.g., 
the control of hand motions) and then later was recruited for some different function (i.e., the 
language faculty).
6
 Of course, the issue of whether a cognitive capacity is or not the direct 
result of natural selection is an entirely empirical issue, not a conceptual one. In any case, it 
seems clear that Chomsky wants to distance himself from the empirical claim that human 
numerical abilities and presumably the language faculty as well could have been directly 
selected in the course of evolution. He might be right (or wrong) in one or both of the cases. It 
seems also clear that Chomsky thinks that the explanatory power of natural selection depends 
on further insight into physical constraints. 
In summary, Chomsky‟s semantic internalism sharply contrasts with the externalism 
                                                 
6 Feathers were first selected because they contributed to thermal regulation. With the increase of the size of 
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of most naturalistically inclined philosophers of mind and language. It in turn reflects, I think, 
Chomsky‟s Galilean assumption according to which theoretical physics is the appropriate 
model of cognitive science. The naturalism of most externalist philosophers of mind and 
evolutionary psychologists is based on the assumption that evolution is mainly driven by the 
mechanism of natural selection. At least, they typically try to provide psychological and/or 
semantic explanations based on the mechanism of natural selection. Chomsky‟s naturalism is 
based on the Galilean assumption that we ought to look for deep physical explanations, which 
in turn leads him to maximize the contribution of physical laws and downplay the role of 
natural selection in the evolution of complex biological systems. He seems to assume that 
time is not ripe yet for providing explanations of cognitive phenomena based on natural 
selection for we still miss basic insights into the physical constraints under which natural 
selection must operate. I certainly am in no position to judge whether he is right. Still, what is 
not always clear from Chomsky‟s writings is whether he thinks that naturalistically inclined 
externalist philosophers and evolutionary psychologists are merely guilty of neglecting the 
role of physical constraints in evolution or whether they are more seriously mistaken in 
assuming that natural selection is involved in explaining why the behavior of human beings 
exemplifies the law of universal gravitation. 
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